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BriaN Glaser
Two Against Freud: 
Pinsky’s “Essay on Psychiatrists” in a 
Philosophical Context
Introduction
in the 1970s the Freudian orthodoxy in europe and the 
U.s. encountered a number of challenges from outside the 
psychiatric establishment. Two such challenges appeared in 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1972/1977) and robert Pinsky’s 1975 “essay on 
Psychiatrists” (1996). The two texts not only presented a criti-
cal reaction to Freud but also, either explicitly or implicitly, 
articulated alternatives to Freudian views on the self and its 
relation to society. Deleuze and Guattari sketched out a per-
spective they called “schizoanalysis” and Pinsky, as a number 
of critics have suggested, implicitly offered the poet as a rival 
to the psychiatrist.1 This article places Pinsky’s “essay on Psy-
chiatrists” in a contextual relation with schizoanalysis, assessing 
how the poem reveals the respective strengths of poetry and 
philosophy in a previous historical period of reaction against 
Freudian orthodoxy.
it should be noted that Deleuze has not often appeared 
as a partner in dialogue amongst critics and scholars of po-
etry, despite his popularity in the related field of film studies. 
One exception is Jon Clay’s Sensation, Contemporary Poetry and 
Deleuze (2010), which applies Deleuzian terminology—such as 
“univocal ontology,” the simulacrum, the “order-word,” and 
“deterritorialization” (pp. 7–9)—to the study of British avant-
garde poetry. interpreting works that resist facile understand-
ing, Clay uses philosophy to make sense out of the sometimes 
bewilderingly rich textures of British experimental poetry. in 
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this article, however, i apply the philosophy of Deleuze and 
Guattari to a reading of Pinsky’s poem so as to locate areas 
where the poetry—as a critical response to psychoanalysis and 
psychiatry—either affirms, supplements, questions, or opposes 
the philosophic insights of Anti-Oedipus. Part of my intention in 
taking this approach is to show the value of Freud as a cultural 
interlocutor even, or perhaps especially, at a time like today 
when his worth is often strenuously doubted and his work 
comfortably disparaged. i see Freud not so much as a source 
of unquestioned authority—as he was and, in some circles, 
remains—in psychology, but rather as a provocative thinker 
whose range of insights reaches well outside his field of expertise 
and challenges both poetry and philosophy to incisive, useful 
discoveries about their own potential powers.
Deleuze, Guattari, and Anti-Oedipal Philosophy
The arguments of Anti-Oedipus traverse political science, 
anthropology, and psychology as well as philosophy, and both 
the ambition of the book and its style resist a concise summary.2 
Nevertheless, i think it necessary and possible to examine 
three key ideas as context for a discussion of Pinsky’s poem. 
The ideas of production, desiring-machines, and schizoanalysis 
are central to Anti-Oedipus and to what the authors object to so 
forcefully about the concept of the Oedipal nature of desire 
in Freud’s work.
Production is a key term for Deleuze and Guattari. indeed 
their most concise critique of the Freudian hermeneutic is put 
in these terms: “When we relate desire to Oedipus, we are con-
demned to ignore the productive nature of desire” (1972/1977, 
p. 107). Productive nature is substantially materialist, even in 
a somewhat perversely sentimental way:
The fact is, from the moment that we are placed within 
the framework of Oedipus . . . the cards are stacked 
against us, and the only real relationship, that of pro-
duction, has been done away with. The great discovery 
of psychoanalysis was that of the production of desire, 
of the productions of the unconscious. But once Oedi-
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pus entered the picture, this discovery was soon buried 
beneath a new brand of idealism: a classical theater was 
substituted for the unconscious as a factory. (p. 24)
But lest readers think that the factory is intended merely as 
a provocative metaphor, Deleuze and Guattari return to it as 
a privileged, concrete site for desiring and, more broadly, for 
human agency in general:
schizoanalysis must devote itself to the necessary destruc-
tions. Destroying beliefs and representations, theatrical 
scenes. and when engaged in this task no activity will 
be too malevolent. Causing Oedipus and castration to 
explode, brutally intervening each time the subject strikes 
up the song of myth or intones tragic lines, carrying him 
back to the factory. (p. 314; emphasis in original)
The unconscious should be understood as a factory that creates 
and directs production and whose productivity mediates or cre-
ates relations with others. instead of a theater in which drives 
take expressive shape or a space where conflicts are figuratively 
played out, the unconscious is continuous with the materials 
of our existence and the industrial economy of contemporary 
capitalism. Here productive power takes the form allowed to 
it by the relations of production in society. in turn, we are 
bound to participate in the social field in ways determined by 
the productions of the unconscious.
in tension with lacanian ideas of subjectivity, Deleuze 
and Guattari insist that the desiring nature of the unconscious 
should not be seen as a manifestation of a lack. Nor should 
incestuous desires that put the subject into conflict with the 
law of the father be seen as constitutive of the unconscious. 
rather, the materially productive unconscious invests the 
subject’s creations with desire, leading to a potentially revolu-
tionary flooding of the field of social production with desire’s 
liberating power:
a truly materialist psychiatry can be defined, on the 
contrary, by the twofold task it sets itself: introducing 
desire into the mechanism, and introducing production 
into desire. (p. 22)
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This conception of the unconscious might sound somewhat 
dreary, at least to those who have been accustomed to seeing 
it in Freudian terms as a space that is filled with figures, pas-
sionate forces, and drives. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, 
a potentially revolutionary consequence follows from seeing 
the unconscious as a space given shape by the elements and 
processes of material production. Once desire has been liber-
ated from its conflict with the law or from its merely allegorical 
role in an Oedipal drama, it can revolutionize society or what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “the socius”:
Despite what some revolutionaries think about this, de-
sire is revolutionary in its essence—desire, not left-wing 
holidays!—and no society can tolerate a position of real 
desire without its structures of exploitation, servitude, 
and hierarchy being compromised. (p. 116)
so important to their argument is the imbrication of 
social production in the desiring unconscious that Deleuze 
and Guattari coin a definition of human beings that takes 
their celebration of materialism to its extreme: humans are 
“desiring-machines” (p. 183). any conception of the individual 
as a private mind or sensibility is rendered deeply problematic. 
The introspective theater of the psychoanalytic consulting room 
becomes, as the authors note, an inert and death-haunted space, 
supplemented by the energetic alternative of the machine. The 
human becomes a kind of a process, one in which its constitu-
ent parts take on a complexity that makes simple declarations 
of intention or assertions of identity difficult to sustain:
Once the structural unity of the machine has been un-
done, once the personal and specific unity of the living 
has been laid to rest, a direct link is perceived between 
the machine and desire, the machine passes to the heart 
of desire, the machine is desiring and desire, machined. 
(p. 285)
The machine-like quality of desire makes Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s consideration of the subject compatible with a poststruc-
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turalist dismantling of the individual, removing any space for 
sentimentality about desire’s arguable independence from the 
material base and industrial economy of capitalism.
What is the role of philosophy, then, if humans are desiring-
machines whose complexity and material constitution eludes 
the theatrical metaphors of Freudian thought and whose revo-
lutionary desire could be liberated to challenge the hierarchies 
and exploitations of capitalist society? Deleuze and Guattari 
point to an answer in their concept of “schizoanalysis”:
it is not the purpose of schizoanalysis to resolve Oedi-
pus, it does not intend to resolve it better than Oedipal 
psychoanalysis does. its aim is to de-oedipalize the un-
conscious in order to reach the real problems. (p. 81)
and what are these real problems? 
The practical problem of schizoanalysis is, then, to ensure 
the contrasting reversion: restoring the syntheses of the 
unconscious to their immanent use. De-oedipalizing, un-
doing the mommy-daddy spider web, undoing the beliefs 
so as to attain the production of desiring-machines, and 
to reach the level of economic and social investments 
where the militant analysis comes into play. (p. 112)
schizoanalysis liberates desiring machines from their confining 
fascination with the familial dynamics of control and announces 
a militant philosophy that will undo the hierarchies of capitalist 
societies. By telling the subject a new story about its motiva-
tions—its impulses to create, to fabricate, to produce, not in 
the service of a wage but of its own irrepressibly productive 
nature—schizoanalysis prepares the way for a utopian social 
movement. a desiring-machine need not be alienated from its 
productive labor but can understand it as a part of the essence 
of the self. it can then transform alienated labor by setting free 
desire to claim its own productivity.
schizoanalysis has what Deleuze and Guattari call a “posi-
tive task” (p. 322). indeed, it has a number of them. The first 
and probably most important is “discovering in a subject the 
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nature, the formation, or the functioning of his desiring ma-
chines, independent of any interpretations. What are your 
desiring-machines, what do you put into these machines, what is 
the output, how does it work, what are your nonhuman sexes?” 
(p. 322) This type of analysis sets eros free from the theater of 
desire to which Freudian thought would consign it and opens 
up a kind of creative freedom: alienated labor can be returned 
to the self through philosophical liberation. Desire is no longer 
interpreted in relation to a primal, determining set of early 
relations but is understood as a vital and compelling power in 
the productive tasks that each person undertakes in the vast 
matrix of potentially liberated, nonhierarchical creativities of 
a capitalist society.
Pinsky, Psychiatry, and Desiring-Machines
Pinsky’s poem “essay on Psychiatrists” is contemporary with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s book and, like the book, is arguably anti-
Oedipal.3 Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, however, Pinsky from 
the start acknowledges the diversity of psychiatry and points to 
a number of telling comparisons with poets:
it’s crazy to think one could describe them—
Calling on reason, fantasy, memory, eyes and ears—
as though they were all alike any more
Than sweeps, opticians, poets or masseurs. (1996, p. 265)
in the context of schizoanalysis this passage has two re-
markable aspects. The first is the speaker’s implicit assertion of 
sanity. This poet has checked his procedure against the criteria 
of madness and found it to be safe. He claims to know what is 
crazy and what is not—and he is decidedly, by implication, on 
the side of sanity. Thus, a bit of the cultural authority of psy-
chiatry is borrowed from the outset and the insane is othered, 
in contrast with schizoanalysis, which finds in insanity a con-
ceptually liberating possibility. as Deleuze and Guattari write, 
“We are all schizos! We are all perverts! We are all libidos that 
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are too viscous and too fluid—and not by preference, but by 
wherever we have been carried by the deterritorialized flows” 
(1972/1977, p. 67). Openness to madness makes possible access 
to the intensities that could revolutionize—“deterritorialize”—
capitalist societies. For Pinsky, however, madness is a threaten-
ing occasion of inhibition.
While acknowledging the empirical diversity of psy-
chiatrists, Pinsky includes a non-descript list of comparable 
professions. “sweeps, opticians, poets or masseurs” are just 
as dangerous to describe as psychiatrists. seen as agents of 
desiring-production, the professions here are distinctive only 
as service occupations, as lines of work participating in the 
transformation of contemporary economies from industrial 
to service paradigms.
among these professions, however, poets provide both a 
service and a product. They are service professionals but they 
are also the producers that Deleuze and Guattari celebrate: 
they are desiring-machines par excellence, who in response to 
a felt desire, create a searching. Thus, Pinsky’s list of diverse 
professions implicitly frames the poet as a worker whose labors 
could invest the producing field with creative energies in a way 
similar to the schizoanalyzed agent in the factory. at a time 
when economies were becoming transformed so that many 
more workers were providing services rather than manufactur-
ing commodities, Pinsky joins Deleuze and Guattari in imagin-
ing producers of materials as endowed with a particular social 
worth and counts poetry among them.
Though he is hesitant to essentialize psychiatrists, Pinsky 
does give them a kind of collective identity and function that 
are, like madness, defensively othered:
and i have never (even this is difficult to say
Plainly, without foolishness or irony)
Consulted one for professional help, though it happens
Many or most of my friends have—and that,
Perhaps, is why it seems so urgent to try to speak
sensibly about them, about the psychiatrists. (1996, 
p. 265)
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What makes for this urgency is the experience of being subject 
to a psychiatric discourse—a discourse from which Pinsky senses 
he has been excluded and which he feels compelled to address 
and to redress. His writing of the poem will be a substitute 
therapy, giving him the kind of understanding of psychiatric 
treatment that many of his friends have had in an unmediated 
way. But this therapeutic function will be conducted from out-
side the psychiatric establishment and so will reflect critically on 
the field rather than adopting its theories and terms. instead of 
the psychiatrist interpreting his unconscious, he will interpret 
the social phenomenon of psychiatrists. instead of the poet 
having a therapeutic experience, he will have created a poem 
about therapy. in this way, Pinsky approaches the ideal of the 
schizoanalyzed desiring-machine, rejecting analysis of the un-
conscious and choosing material production over internalized 
psychological allegories.
Thus, by the end of the short, first section of the poem, 
Pinsky has articulated that his essay is to be conducted in the 
name of creative production, he has posited a tentatively analo-
gous relation between poet and analysand, and he has taken 
up a position outside of that Oedipal theater which Deleuze 
and Guattari abjure. in the second section, he suggests some 
of the ways that poetry works like psychiatry:
in a way i suspect that even the terms “doctor”
and “therapist” are misnomers; the patient
is not necessarily “sick.” and one assumes
That no small part of the psychiatrist’s
role is just that: to point out misnomers. (p. 265)
Pinsky here seems interested to deepen the analogies between 
poet and psychiatrist by noting implicitly that both work care-
fully with words. The poet and psychiatrist stand together in 
guarding the use of language in a careful, cautious, correct way. 
By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari might see such cautiousness 
as inhibition and defeat: “How odd the psychoanalytic venture 
is. Psychoanalysis ought to be a song of life, or else it be worth 
nothing at all. it ought, practically, to teach us to sing life. and 
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see how the most defeated, sad song of death emanates from it” 
(1972/1977, p. 331). exploring the ways in which psychiatry is 
continuous with art, Pinsky approaches the psychiatric project 
as something more multi-faceted than simply and slavishly ap-
plying Oedipal interpretations to the unconscious—something 
even to celebrate as a social practice.
if the careful attention to choice of words is something 
that Pinsky offers as common ground and grounds for appre-
ciation, it follows that he invites readers to think about his own 
choices as particularly deliberate. For instance his description 
of a woman at a beach party:
 one of the few townsfolk there,
With no faculty status—a matter-of-fact, competent,
Catholic woman of twenty-seven with five children
and a first-rate body […] (1996, p. 266)
Pinsky moves from the discussion of this contemporary 
woman to an ancient set of threatening women—euripides’ 
Bacchae—with which to think about the values and limits of 
psychiatry. spending four sections—six through ten—of his 
poem reflecting on euripides’ drama, he asks which of the two 
characters from the tragedy can be considered as analogous 
to the psychiatrist: Pentheus—who is ripped apart by a crowd 
of delirious women, including his mother—or Dionysius, who 
drives the group of women, the Bacchae, insane and leads 
Pentheus to his fate as a punishment for banning worship of 
and tribute to him. Pentheus appears as a credible surrogate 
for the psychiatrist because he “hears everything” and, while he 
listens to what Pinsky calls a “middle-class fantasy of release,” 
he nevertheless “raises his voice in the name of dignity” (pp. 
269–270). Yet, Dionysius is also a candidate for that role from 
a “more hostile view”: although he knowingly orchestrates 
the scene of violent death, he still plays a positive role in that 
he “cures // Pentheus of the grand delusion that the dark / 
Urgencies can be governed simply by the mind, / and the 
mind’s will” (p. 270).
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Madness and Liberation
From the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, we lose 
much by turning to literature as a vehicle for interpretive 
thought. For them, the interpretive faculty is less significant 
or even trustworthy than the faculty of desiring-production: 
in their words, “literature is like schizophrenia: a process and 
not a goal” (1972/1977, p. 133). To see a work of literature 
as a text that can be interrogated for layers of meanings is to 
lose or fail to grasp a sense of the flows and intensities that 
artistic production can manifest. For Pinsky, however, both 
his own poem and euripides’ tragic drama are vehicles for a 
combined hermeneutic and therapeutic process: one reaches 
greater self-understanding by making interpretive choices and 
following their consequences.
While Deleuze and Guattari seek the liberation of desire, 
Pinsky seeks an understanding of madness. His question as 
to which character in euripides is a figure for the psychiatrist 
would be anathema to Deleuze and Guattari. The question, 
however, that underlies this rumination is: What can i learn 
about myself by interpreting these characters through a fanta-
sized figure of the psychiatrist? This deeper question leads to a 
therapeutic reflection. The necessity of “dark / Urgencies” that 
Pentheus learns echo the “urgent” project he has set himself at 
the beginning of the poem. This is the more true because of 
the sad and ominous irony in his assertion that Dionysius has 
taught this lesson to Pentheus: the only way Pentheus learned 
this lesson was by being destroyed. it is through Pentheus that 
Pinsky envisions the irrepressibility of madness in the social 
field and the inability to keep it from overtaking the subject, 
from threatening the sense of identity, and from insinuating 
itself into imaginative life. in interpreting the tragedy he is 
interpreting himself, learning about the kinds of madness that 
he is intent on keeping at bay, making a kind of negotiation 
with madness through a sense of proximity that his investment 
in the figure of the psychiatrist helps to enable.
Pinsky’s poem ranges across a variety of subjects, including 
the philistinism of psychiatrists, the death of one at the hands 
of a patient, and the representation of them in the comics 
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of a newspaper. He returns, however, to his central theme of 
madness in the eighteenth section of the poem, discovering 
that he has at least as much difficulty generalizing about the 
mad as he does about psychiatrists:
Other patients are ill otherwise, and do 
scream and pace and kill or worse; and that
should be recalled. Kit smart, Hitler,
The contemporary poets of lunacy—none of them
Helps me to think of the mad otherwise
Than in clichés too broad, the maenads
and wild-eyed killers of the movies . . . 
But perhaps lunacy feels something like a cliché, 
a desperate or sweet yielding to some broad,
Mechanical simplification, a dispersal
Of the unbearable into its crude fragments,
The distraction of a repeated gesture
Or a compulsively hummed tune. Maybe 
it is not utterly different from chewing
at one’s fingernails. (1996, p. 276)
Barbara lefcowitz (1981) has noted the tendency of Pinsky in 
this poem to qualify his assertions, arguing that this tendency 
displays a kind of ambivalence toward psychiatrists. i would 
argue, however, that Pinsky’s uncertainty has to do with his 
ambivalence toward madness. He tarries with closeness to mad-
ness only finally to reassure himself that he has found nothing.
and it is this nothingness that becomes an insight. The 
crucial development comes when Pinsky suggests that the 
characteristic of the cliché—its emptiness—is of the nature of 
insanity itself. There is an implication here—i think that it is 
one that is not itself clichéd—that in some cases an essential 
emptiness lies at the source of madness, that madness can be 
the quality of missing something in one’s psyche, something 
that those people, considered to be well, have enough of. He 
develops this thought at the end of the section:
456 “Essay on Psychiatrists” in a Philosophical Context
 When my friend
Went in, we both tried to joke: “Karen,” i said,
“You must be crazy to spend money and time
in this place”—she gained weight, 
Made a chess-board, had a roommate
Who introduced herself as the Virgin Mary,
referred to another patient: “Well, she must
Be an interesting person, if she’s in here.” (1996, p. 277)
Unimaginative activities—eating and making chessboards— 
seem to characterize the asylum. earlier, Pinsky has suggested 
that madness might be as ordinary as chewing one’s fingernails. 
Thus, the blank feeling that comes over one when confronted 
by clichés becomes a model for what madness is or can be: an 
emptiness, a vacuity.
at this point, Pinsky’s text suggests a direct challenge to the 
valorization of the schizo in Anti-Oedipus. What if schizophrenia 
is simply a kind of inner absence? Deleuze and Guattari would 
surely object to the positing of an inwardness in which there 
can be something missing, a lack. and what they have to say 
about the schizo and his or her various forms of escape from the 
fetters of capitalism goes beyond cliché. But Pinsky’s example 
of Karen contrasts tellingly with the textualized version of the 
schizo that Deleuze and Guattari discuss in Judge schreber. 
Pinsky offers a contemporary, familiar counter-example and 
a reflective context in which madness as emptiness can take 
on a haunting quality. Though hidden behind the threat of 
cliché, the experience of saying nothing becomes an unsettling 
interpretive clue to the nature of madness that has fascinated 
him throughout the text.
Conclusion
This haunting emptiness returns at the end of the poem. 
Undertaking again his characteristic self-interrogation about 
what generalizations he can offer—a reflection that sometimes 
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allows him at the same time to advance a compelling picture 
of the poet—Pinsky finds that he does have closing comments 
about psychiatrists:
essaying to distinguish these men and women,
Who try to give medicine for misery,
From the rest of us, i find i have failed
To discover what essential statement could be made
about psychiatrists that would not apply
To all human beings, or what statement
about all human beings would not apply
equally to psychiatrists. They, too,
Consult psychiatrists. They try tentatively
To understand, to find healing speech. They work
For truth and for money. They are contingent . . .
They talk and talk . . . they are, in the words
Of a lute-player i met once who despised them,
“into machines”…(pp. 279–280)
What does it mean to be “into machines”? Pinsky clearly en-
dorses the description, implying that the process of psychiatric 
treatment can be devitalizing. The fact that a musician makes 
the assertion is not irrelevant. His or her artistic creativity lends 
power to the criticism of the lifeless products of psychiatry. The 
originality and provocativeness of Deleuze and Guattari’s desir-
ing-machines is visible by contrast: they seek in the idea of the 
machine a path to rehabilitate a culture that Pinsky represents 
as lacking in vitality. But this assertion about psychiatrists—while 
it furthers Pinsky’s aim of valorizing the arts as an alternative to 
psychiatry for wisdom and cultural energy—raises a last ques-
tion. Could it not be that the aim of some psychoanalysts is 
indeed to transcend the Oedipal scenario, to work through it 
so thoroughly that it is less deeply internalized, even purged? 
if Pinsky’s psychiatrists are “into machines” and schizoanalysts 
are “into desiring-machines,” there thus remains the possibility 
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that Freudians can be into the transformative and liberating 
power of self-knowledge.
Notes
1. Both Neil scheurich (2001) and Barbara F. lefcowitz (1981) make this claim 
about Pinsky’s poem.
2. in this respect, consider the provocative interpretation of the style of the book 
offered by lyat Friedman (2010): “an Oedipal reader who attempts to find 
meaning in the machine offered in Anti-Oedipus is resisted by the text and is thus 
forced to divert his or her drives away from Oedipus and discover other means 
of expressing the ids” (p. 97). i disagree with the implication of this quote that 
to read for a sense of comprehension of an argument or arguments makes one 
an “Oedipal reader,” though i am not quite sure what the term means. i disagree 
thus with the similar interpretation by Fadi abou-rihan (2008) that “the style of 
Anti-Oedipus is inextricably tied to the theory it advocates” (p. 33).
3. The writers whom Deleuze and Guattari cite most often are samuel Beckett, 
Henry Miller, and D.H. lawrence, but they use them to articulate mostly mod-
ernist clichés of fragmentation and dispersal.
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